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so the People’s Liberation Army would
“likely choose the historical responsibil-
ity of keeping Taiwan part of China”;
Thacik counters that the Taiwanese
“will not permit an accommodation of
China’s demands that Taiwan become
subordinate to Beijing.” This standoff is
a recipe for disaster, but one that is all
too often obscured and glossed over
rather than highlighted.
Finally, U.S.-China military relations
are addressed by Paul Godwin and Al-
fred Wilhelm, Jr., while U.S.-China re-
lations in general are outlined by
Richard Thornton and David Lai. These
authors again present a mixed bag, with
Godwin warning of a U.S.-Chinese “es-
calation dynamic expanding the scope
of the war beyond the intent of either
adversary”; Wilhelm calling for remov-
ing “all remaining military-related
sanctions on the PRC” and promoting
increased military-to-military talks;
Thornton advocating measures to
“curb” Chinese ambitions “now before
China becomes too strong to control
and we find ourselves on the path to
war ”; and Lai arguing that the China
threat has been “overblown.” Since the
book does not include a much-needed
conclusion to sort through this morass,
or an index to assist in locating particu-
lar topics of interest, the reader is left
with the unfortunate impression that
the experts could not agree with each
other, much less with the editors, on
what final message they should present
to their audience.
While many essays in this book are
quite good, they do not work well as a
whole. One is left with the feeling that
the editors published whatever they
were given, with one essay on the air
force numbering almost forty pages,
while a scant four pages are devoted to
China’s all-important relations with
Russia, where the bulk of the PLA’s
most deadly weapons are purchased.
Furthermore, there is no chapter de-
voted specifically to Sino-Japanese rela-
tions, though various authors admit
that Japan is China’s nearest great
power and maritime rival. Equally rele-
vant topics not raised by this book in-
clude rising tensions over North Korea;
China’s space program and the rapid
growth of its missile forces; territorial
disputes in the South China Sea; and
the U.S.-led efforts with Japan, and
perhaps even Taiwan, to build theater
and national missile defense. For these
reasons, this book falls short as an ex-
amination of the true nature of U.S.-
Chinese relations.
BRUCE ELLEMAN
Naval War College
Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars:
State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria,
Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Viet-
nam. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003,
295pp. $22.99
In this work, Gil Merom, an assistant
professor of political science at Tel Aviv
University, sets forth an intriguing
proposition based on case studies of
conflicts occurring in the second half of
the twentieth century. Democracies, he
argues, fail to win small wars because,
as democracies, they are unable to bear
either the casualties, particularly from
among the “educated middle class,”
that such wars produce or the brutality
winning such wars requires. If valid, the
implications of proving such a hypothe-
sis are significant. For starters, a hard
blow would be dealt to the interna-
tional relations school of realism and its
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offshoots. These models tend to view
relative national power, especially mili-
tary power, as the primary determinant of
military success—a tenet that Merom’s
conclusions seem to refute. To the con-
trary, his findings would seem to offer
substantial vindication to analysts and
scholars who believe constituencies in a
democratic society’s domestic political
system are the true drivers of such a
state’s international behavior.
While important to political scientists
and international relations scholars,
Merom’s question could not be more
timely for national leaders struggling to
advance their interests in the real world,
for his work suggests that an entire
family of conflict is not likely to be won
by democracies. It would therefore fol-
low that democracies should either
avoid small wars altogether, strike and
win before public opinion can react, or
handle these conflicts with nonmilitary
instruments. Put more bluntly, it would
imply that the United States may be
unable to secure victory in either the
Middle East or Central Asia, because
the American people will not condone
the type of action required to win these
wars and keep casualties low. Merom
includes the intentional targeting of
noncombatants, the use of concentra-
tion camps, intentional deprivation of
food and water to a civilian popula-
tion, forced exile, torture, and indis-
criminate bombing as some of the
brutal means traditionally used to win
small wars.
It is impossible not to see similarities
between Merom’s case studies and cur-
rent U.S. operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq. However, a closer reading re-
veals not only significant questions but
weaknesses concerning Merom’s work.
First, it rapidly becomes apparent that
his case studies involve counter-
insurgencies, not the much broader
spectrum of conflict to which the term
“small wars” refers. Thus the successful
invasions of Grenada, Panama, and
Haiti are not examined. Neither are
such successful limited interventions
as the French operations ARTEMIS and
TOURQUOISE in Africa, the British in
Sierra Leone, or the United States in
Liberia. In fact, Merom focuses on
guerrilla warfare, a type of small war
identified by C. E. Callwell, who wrote
the book on small wars in the eighteenth
century, as “the most unfavorable shape
which a campaign [can] take for the
regular troops.”
The need for brutal measures to ensure
victory is also an assumption that de-
serves to be challenged. Merom does
not make the case that the only way to
win against a counterinsurgency is
through such methods. While he identi-
fies several historical examples of great
powers embracing brutal methods to
defeat insurgencies in the past, he does
not prove that they made the difference
between victory and defeat. Nor does he
prove that such measures must be part
of a future winning arsenal.
There are also problems with his selec-
tion of cases. Merom chose three failed
counterinsurgencies to make his point;
however, Malaya in the 1950s, Greece
in the 1940s, and Central America in
the 1980s and 1990s would seem to of-
fer obvious historical counterexamples
to Merom’s thesis. Interestingly,
Merom, on one page and in one foot-
note, acknowledges the existence of the
British involvement in Malaya, but he
does not identify this conflict as a suc-
cessful postwar counterinsurgency. Thus
it would seem unwarranted at this point
to claim that Merom’s conclusions
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 5 3
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2005.vp
Thursday, March 17, 2005 3:23:37 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 2, Art. 16
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss2/16
apply to all small wars, or even to all
counterinsurgencies.
A related if less telling criticism is that
the three selected conflicts are clearly
grouped at the more robust end of the
small-wars spectrum. The size of a war
may be measured by intensity (number
of deaths over a given time), duration
(amount of time over which killing oc-
curs), or scale (number of total deaths).
Other units of measure could be fiscal
cost, percentage of armed forces en-
gaged, or the extent to which a state’s
vital national interests are at risk. None
of the wars Merom looks at were quick,
low-cost affairs. Perhaps they should
not be included in the “small war” cate-
gory at all.
That said, this book is not without
merit. It certainly suggests several areas
for future research. Of these, one of the
more intriguing would be the use of lo-
cally recruited military forces as a
means to achieve victory in counter-
insurgencies and other forms of small
wars without generating adverse do-
mestic public opinion. Such forces have
traditionally had key roles in small wars
throughout history. Merom’s findings
suggest that the need for such units may
be bigger than ever.
When it comes to the specific cases of
Vietnam, Algeria, and Lebanon,
Merom’s scholarship and argument are
convincing. Public opinion and war fa-
tigue, aversion to casualties, and refusal
to endorse certain methods of warfare
clearly impacted national decision mak-
ing in these cases. Merom demonstrates
that forces unleashed in the various do-
mestic political systems examined in
this study had a profound impact on
war prosecution and termination. Any
scholar wishing to understand these
conflicts in deeper detail should read
the appropriate chapters of this book.
Again, it should be noted that it is im-
possible not to see similarities between
these cases and current U.S. operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The potential for such domestically
driven forces to impact national secu-
rity policy is clearly something that
should be of interest to any modern
political-military leader or scholar. For,
as this review is being published, U.S.
and coalition forces in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan are determinedly attempting
to defeat counterinsurgencies while try-
ing to avoid initiating the forces Merom
examines. So while Merom’s work does
not provide the key to the problem of
counterinsurgency, it does seem to pro-
vide at least a significant piece of the
puzzle.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Ambrose, Stephen E. To America: Personal Reflec-
tions of an Historian. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2003. 288pp. $24
The United States is the richest and
most powerful country in the world.
Yet over two hundred years ago it be-
gan as thirteen colonies at the edge of a
continental wilderness. Stephen
Ambrose, an eminent historian and
skilled writer, has used this short, read-
able book to explain how the United
States made this amazing transforma-
tion. He attributes its success as a na-
tion to the American spirit.
The American spirit originated with the
founding fathers and was further devel-
oped by presidents Andrew Jackson,
Ulysses S. Grant, Franklin and Theodore
Roosevelt, and Dwight D. Eisenhower.
1 5 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2005.vp
Thursday, March 17, 2005 3:23:38 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
3
Norton and Merom: How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
